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And they lived happily ever after UPC Telekabel: a copyright fairy tale or a 
genuine chance to strike a fair balance? * 
Giulia Dore 
Introduction 
The case concerns a request for a preliminary ruling by the EU Court of Justice on the 
interpretation of Article 8(3) of the Directive 2001/29/EC, and of certain fundamental rights 
protected by European Union law.  
The CJEU deals with the liability of intermediaries for copyright infringement and online 
blocking injunctions, in line with its effort to ensure full protection of copyright on the one 
hand, and some exceptions to the responsibility of Internet intermediaries on the other.  
First, it asserts the intermediary function of Internet service providers (ISPs). Second, it 
assesses the legitimacy of imposing an injunction aimed at preventing the ISPs’ customers from 
accessing a third-party website that infringes copyright by unlawfully making material available 
to the public. Then, it explores the feasibility of an order that, instead of indicating the specific 
measures to execute it, only prescribes an outcome obligation to cease or even prevent the 
infringement.  
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Similar injunctions are compliant with EU law as long as they allow the ISPs to choose 
the best applicable measures, which should not impair the necessary fair balance of fundamental 
rights enjoyed by all stakeholders. 
Background of the dispute 
In 2011 UPC Telekabel, a telecommunications company whose services include Internet 
access, was ordered to deny its customers access to a website (kino.to) that was found to infringe 
copyright by making some content publicly accessible, short of the consent of the rightsholders, 
film production companies Constantin Film and Wega. The applicants succeeded in obtaining 
an interim injunction by the Austrian Commercial Court (Handelsgericht Wien), ruling that the 
order be executed and applying the measure of blocking the infringing website’s domain name 
and its Internet protocol addresses. 
The parties lodged an appeal before the Higher Regional Court in Vienna 
(Oberlandesgericht Wien) that partially overturned the lower court’s ruling by acknowledging 
the right of the claimants to seek the injunction, but requiring that the order should only provide 
a general obligation and not the specific measures to apply. Not satisfied with the outcome, 
UPC Telekabel brought the case before the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshoft), 
radically denying any involvement and then alleging the worthlessness and unreasonableness 
of any given blocking measure.  
Both courts, in the first instance and on appeal, scrutinized the role of ISPs in online 
copyright infringement, agreeing that UPC Telekabel is an intermediary according to Article 
8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive.1 The respondent’s services were using the website at issue to 
perpetrate infringing activities affecting the rightsholders. 
What differentiates the rulings is the divergent consideration given to the measures to 
apply to fulfil the order. The claimants applied for measures that would have blocked access to 
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the website, a condition that the first court found to be satisfied by indicating all the terms of 
the injunction. The appealed court’s findings differ precisely on this last point, endorsing the 
respondent’s freedom to choose the most reasonable measures to comply with the court’s order. 
On appeal, UPC Telekabel denied any involvement in the infringing activities, insisting 
that, given the lack of any contractual or business relationship with the website, it was not 
determined that its services were actually used to perpetrate the infringement; neither was it 
proved that its customers were engaging in such unlawful activities. Any blocking measures 
would have been unreasonable in terms of costs, easily bypassed and in clear conflict with 
several EU provisions. Consequently, the Supreme Court stayed the proceedings to question 
the CJEU on the interpretation of European law.  
Matters before the CJEU  
There were four queries for preliminary ruling, of which only two were explicitly addressed, 
the others being contingent.  
They can be summarized as follows. Shall Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive be 
interpreted as the ISP being an intermediary whose services are used by a third party to infringe 
copyright, and thus the injunction brought against them is valid under EU law? If so, are the 
fundamental rights of all interested parties protected and properly balanced when such an 
injunction allows the ISP to undertake its own measures to comply without impairing all other 
stakeholders’ interests? 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered a detailed opinion to the case at issue. He 
considered the legal framework that applied to the dispute, carefully analysing the facts and 
terms of the claims in the proceedings and reviewing the previous relevant CJEU’s case law.2  
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In line with his arguments, Recital 59 to the Preamble and Articles 3 and 8 of the InfoSoc 
Directive offer general justification for the highest and most effective level of copyright 
protection, especially in the case of massive infringement, which has allegedly increased along 
with new technologies.3 This puts intermediaries, and ISPs appear to be regarded as such,4 in 
the best position to stop and prevent the violation,5 to the extent that they should be subject to 
injunctions when third parties use their services to perpetrate such illegal acts.6  
In his view,7 such conclusions do not conflict with the prohibition of imposing general 
monitoring on providers according to Article 15 of the Electronic Commerce Directive.8 
Likewise, in light of Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive,9 they do not clash with the further 
requirement that the measures must not be unreasonable in terms of technicality or costs, but 
abide by the principles of appropriateness, effectiveness and proportionality.10 
The Advocate General plainly supported the applicants’ demand for high and effective 
copyright protection, which could only be reached by acknowledging the intermediary 
responsibility of ISPs in the case of infringement, but also indicating the specific remedial 
measures to be applied. This would satisfy the requirement of proper and fair balance among 
all fundamental rights at stake.11  
On the contrary, it can be inferred that a mere outcome prohibition would result in an 
imbalanced solution since there would be no guidance by the CJEU or the domestic courts in 
terms of the best compliant measures that least sacrifice other parties’ interests.12 
The ruling: a compromised solution for a balanced approach to copyright 
Despite the accurateness of the Advocate General’s reasoning, which has the valuable feature 
of calling for appropriate guidelines, the Court of Justice shares only the first part of his 
arguments,  surprisingly discarding his latest proposal on the accurateness of imposing specific 
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measures on the respondent. However, the CJEU’s disregard may rather be seen as being 
nothing more than even-handed and cautiously pondered.  
The CJEU points out that undoubtedly the website’s action of placing content on the 
Internet, making it available to the public without the consent of its rightsholders, results in 
copyright infringement.13 There seems to be no hesitation in determining that usage of the 
intermediaries’ services consists in the mere transmission of the infringement in the ISP’s 
network: when the provider grants access to its network it makes such transmission effective.14 
In other words, the injunction imposed on the service provider that materially consents to such 
infringement by allowing its customer to access that website is both lawful and consistent with 
EU law.  
The ISP’s intermediary role is not contradicted by the lack of any contractual, or a 
different kind of, relationship between the ISP and the infringing website,15 it also being 
irrelevant to prove that the ISP’s customers actually accessed the website.16 Recalling previous 
cases on the subject, the CJEU also projects a clear preventive role of ISPs against copyright 
infringement, a circumstance that strengthens the irrelevance of proving that the defendant’s 
customers interact with the infringer by concretely accessing its website.17 
What appears to predominate in the Court’s conclusion is that a failure to acknowledge 
the intermediary nature of ISPs would resolve in an unwanted decrease in the rightsholders’ 
shield, thus refuting the actual scope of the InfoSoc Directive to ensure the highest and most 
effective level of copyright protection.18 
The Court is of the opinion that all affected fundamental rights, not limited to copyright 
and related rights, shall be protected under EU copyright law.19 Whether the substantial and 
procedural aspects surrounding the sanctions for copyright infringement are left to the 
discretion of national legislators,20 this does not imply that Member States should not to abide 
by the limits of EU law when defining the rules for issuing and executing injunctions.21  
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Even in their discretion, domestic courts should always aim to strike a fair balance among 
all fundamental rights involved, avoiding any conflicts among all interested parties’ rights,22 
such as the freedom to conduct business by the ISPs and the freedom of information enjoyed 
by their customers and users.23 
Regarding the former, which finds its justification in Article 16 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the Charter), 24 arguably 
the injunction itself does not utterly deprive such a liberty.25 The ISP may always prove its 
compliance with the order providing it has adopted all reasonable measures.26 
Consequently, injunctions are not boundless, especially when the ability of the ISP to 
implement the prescribed measures depends on its resources and may entail practical 
difficulties or excessive costs.27 Furthermore, the Court foresees that some restricting measures 
can easily be bypassed, a possibility that is yet consistent with the idea that copyright does not 
receive unconditional protection.28 
Concerning the latter, shielded by Article 11 of the Charter, the CJEU highlights the risk 
of jeopardizing the right of information by adopting measures that, imposing the burden of the 
injunction on both customer and users, for example, impeding their lawful access to the Internet, 
unjustly interfere with it.29  
It can be concluded that an outcome prohibition is compliant with EU law as far as it 
represents a balanced solution.30 In the Court’s view, it is the ISP’s duty to choose the most 
effective and proportional measures to comply with the court’s order while maintaining both 
their right to conduct business and the customers’ and users’ rights to access the Internet and to 
be informed.31 
Analysis 
The necessary layer of fundamental rights on top of copyright protection 
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The role of injunctions as instruments of rapid and virtually straightforward relief is 
undeniably relevant, especially when other actions have proved to be unsatisfactory.32 It is also 
accurate to say that under EU copyright law Member States have a strict obligation to ensure 
that rightsholders may effectively seek injunctive relief against intermediaries.  
Although rules and procedures for such injunctions remain at the discretion of national 
legislators, domestic law must always abide by the pertinent EU provisions and general 
principles that place some boundaries with reference to the intermediary’s liability. This results 
in certain limitations on the general effort to enforce copyright and related rights, their 
protection not being absolute.33 The chosen measures to execute the order must, in any case, be 
fair and equitable, not entailing unnecessary complications or unreasonable costs.  
In line with the aim to ensure full protection of copyright, Article 8 of the InfoSoc 
Directive enables rightsholders to request an injunction against intermediaries whose services 
are used by a third party to infringe copyright or related rights. Remedies and sanctions must 
be designed to discourage any further unlawful conduct and, most of all, be fair and 
proportionate.34 This means that they should not negatively affect the rights of other 
stakeholders in copyright and related rights’ issues. 
While recognizing the ability of intermediaries to stop infringing activities and effectively 
prevent them, this should not result in an unlimited burden for ISPs and their customers or 
users.35 The Court ruling makes it entirely clear that it is critically important to safeguard 
freedom of information, as well as to conduct business, rights that are as important as copyright 
and related rights. 
The Court of Justice has often shown its commitment to ensuring a balanced approach to 
copyright.36 In LSG vs Tele2,37 extensively cited in the instant ruling, the Court resolved that 
Internet access providers are intermediaries within the meaning of Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc 
Directive, even if they only provide access to the Internet and no more burdening services such 
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as hosting. However, the entitlement of copyright holders to seek relief from infringement does 
not encompass sacrificing fair balance among all involved fundamental rights that any Member 
State must strike. 
The Luxembourg judges have directly addressed the feasibility of specific injunctive 
measures, such as the installation of filtering software and blocking users’ access to infringing 
websites. In Scarlet vs SABAM,38 the Court ruled that unlimited filtering was not compliant with 
EU law since it conflicted with the intermediary’s freedom to conduct business. In SABAM vs 
Netlog,39 the injunction against the provider was unlawful as it applied measures that required 
carrying out general and preventive monitoring to screen the information conveyed, which was 
particularly costly and impaired the aforementioned balance. 
Bonnier Audio vs Perfect ruled that there is no formal impediment, according to the 
concurrent reading of Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive and Article 15(1) of the Personal 
Data or E-Privacy Directive,40 for a national court to make the ISP disclose the personal data 
of its customers when it is proved that they have infringed copyright.41 However, such an order 
should always be the result of a careful assessment that targets a fair balance among the different 
rights at issue, including the protection of personal data and privacy in the electronic 
environment.42 The same concerns apply to the safeguarding of other rights enjoyed by 
customers and users, as well as by intermediaries.43 
Yes, intermediaries. Yet, still protectable 
Returning to the case at issue, there seems to be limited room for rejecting the interpretation of 
Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive as applicable to ISPs. It is hard to argue that they do not 
take on this position or that rightsholders cannot seek injunctive relief when a third party using 
their services infringes their copyright or ancillary rights. 
9 
The cautious approach of the CJEU in rejecting the radical approach of the plaintiffs to 
prescribe specific measures is, for the most part, welcomed. This prudence corroborates the 
Court’s challenge to consider that all interested parties’ rights are equally worthy. However, the 
Court’s intents may be, de facto, unrealistic, as it is implausible that all rights will be weighted 
in the same way. There is a reasonable expectation that the CJEU may guide Member States in 
the difficult task of deciding whether, and to what extent, one particular right should prevail 
over the others. It seems insufficient merely to quote the provisions of the EU Charter without 
providing a more comprehensive in-depth regulation.44 
Regarding expectations, the Court could have explored another issue that would be 
welcomed as a further clarification of the risk that some measures concretely entail the general 
monitoring of communication that EU law bans. Article 15 of the EC Directive prohibits 
measures requiring the intermediary such as the ISP to conduct general monitoring of 
information transmitted through its network: no general monitor, either defensive or preventive, 
is allowed.45  
This aspect does not seem to worry the CJEU. Besides, this could be precisely the reason 
why the Court, thus far concerned with fair balance, is discarding the AG’s suggestion to 
impose specific measures.Any measures that require general monitoring, as seems to be the 
case with filtering systems, would also be in conflict with Article 3 of the Enforcement 
Directive, being unnecessary and probably costly. They would impair the principle of 
safeguarding fair balance among stakeholders’ rights. As Scarlet vs SABAM proves, an 
injunction to apply similar measures apparently would not strike the necessary balance. 
A survey of UK case law: a matter of proportionality 
Similar considerations arise when exploring the recent case law on the topic in the United 
Kingdom. Such a survey is of particular interest as it portrays few controversial aspects in the 
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matter of blocking injunctions against ISPs. Moreover, looking into another Member State’s 
approach facilitates an overall look at the issue in question and puts forward a different way of 
understanding the commented ruling.46 
First, one may wonder whether a similar injunction would satisfy the UK requirements 
of the intermediary services being used by the infringer and the actual knowledge of such usage 
by the intermediary, according to Section 97(A) of the Copyright, Design and Patent Act of 
1988 (hereinafter CDPA). Second, it is debatable whether the proportionality principle is 
observed when a similar order does not merely indicate the outcome of denying access to the 
contested website, but also specifies the exact measures to apply for compliance. 
The law prescribes that an injunction may be granted if the court determines that the ISP 
had actual knowledge of the fact that its services had been used to infringe copyright. For its 
purposes, actual knowledge is the situation of knowing that the infringement has occurred by 
using the intermediary’s services. However, it is not that clear from the mere wording of the 
provision whether a genuine knowledge of a precise infringer using these services is required 
or, as the UK Court seems to favour, it is sufficient to know that the services are being used to 
perpetrate any infringement.47 
As is evident from the literary phrasing of Section 97(A) CDPA, there is no doubt that 
ISPs are intermediaries. The section explicitly refers to Internet service providers, and the court 
shall only assess whether or not the respondent of the injunctive claim is an ISP. Furthermore, 
it has not seemed difficult to assess what specific acts concretely constitute copyright 
infringement. Nevertheless, it is not immediately possible to assess whether a given injunction 
conclusively complies with the proportionality principle and therefore strikes the fundamental 
rights’ fair balance that all Member States are expected to seek under EU law. 
The UK judiciary has dealt with ISPs blocking injunctions in a number of cases,48 many 
decided by Lord Arnold J., whose approach is apparently plain and flawless.49 
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In the Twentieth Century Fox disputes,50 injunctions were granted against ISPs to block 
users’ access to infringing websites. The Court, by explicitly referring to the EU decision in 
LSG to explicate usage of the ISPs’ services, ruled that actual knowledge of the infringement 
was proved, even by the circumstance that the ISPs received previous notice and had the chance 
to act and defend themselves. In the Court’s view, the injunction sought was clear, precise, and 
technically feasible,51 while the cost to execute it was part of the business process.52 
The question of assessing the proper balance among the rights of copyright holders and 
users was explored in Golden Eye vs Telefónica. The Court granted applicants the right to seek 
injunctive relief through claim letters, guiding the terms of such requests to safeguard the 
interests of users: a guidance that the CJEU in the case at commentary had the chance to provide 
but for other reasons sidestepped.53 
In Dramatico vs Sky, after assessing the joint liability of the respondent and the users, 
Lord Arnold accepted the terms of the agreement reached by the parties to restrict customers’ 
access to the file-sharing facilitator, the Pirate Bay,54  which was allegedly infringing 
copyright.55 The agreed measure of IP address blocking was consistent with the provisions of 
the EU Charter. As he concluded, such a measure was neither excessive nor impaired users’ 
rights to use the ISP’s services lawfully.56 
In Emi vs Sky his Lordship ordered that the ISPs block their customers’ access to a number 
of peer-to-peer (P2P) websites, where copyright-protected material was shared massively and 
unlawfully,57 and substantial evidence supported awareness of the infringement. The ISPs could 
have easily complied with the injunctions since they had been respondents in similar cases; it 
was then reasonable and affordable to execute such orders. 
Finally, the recent decisions of Paramount vs Sky and FAPL vs Sky confirmed the Court’s 
trend to grant injunctions under Section 97(A) CDPA, indicating the applicable measures to 
fulfil with the order.58 There was no hesitation in acknowledging the intermediary nature of the 
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respondents, either in concluding that third parties used their services to infringe copyright or 
that the ISPs had actual knowledge of this. As simply as that, in both cases the orders were 
appropriate and proportionate.59 
In all the cases cited above, Lord Arnold deliberated on the risk that such a measure could 
have limited subscribers’ legitimate use of the ISPs’ services. To such an extent, he explicitly 
considered all the aforementioned issues, although he concluded that the injunctions were 
justified by the outweighed prevalence of copyright protection. Apparently, this may be seen 
as the result of an effortless or posturing resolution, but a careful reading of the decisions reveals 
the contrary. 
Applying the proportionality principle before granting the injunctions, the Court ruled in 
favour of the copyright holders even though this meant overcoming other fundamental rights 
such as the right of expression and information, and the freedom to conduct business. It was 
stated that copyright is not, as such, predominant, but rather it is the task of the judiciary to 
establish, case by case, which rights should prevail over others. The orders were proportionate, 
given the facts of each dispute and after having compared the rights of all stakeholders, 
including users and business operators. 
In the words of Arnold J on Emi Records, in which he comprehensively considered the 
assessment of proportionality, the interest of copyright owners overweighs the rights protected 
by Articles 11 and 16 of the EU Charter, but their dominance must be asserted after careful and 
thorough deliberation on a case-to-case basis. Since the injunctions were also narrowed and 
targeted, and the cost of implementation modest and proportionate, all the premises were in 
place to reach such conclusions confidently.60 
Such a forthright approach may confirm the imprint that a choice – as arbitrary as this 
may sound – must be made when dealing with balancing rights in copyright law, especially 
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when the proportionality assessment is evoked as an essential duty of the courts of any Member 
State, regardless of the CJEU’s intention to provide specific guidelines.  
The UK solution also has its negative effects. Despite the positive confidence of the 
judiciary striking the fairest and most proportionate balance among the rights at stake, there is 
still animplied threat of imposing the burden of the injunction on one side only. It should not 
be necessarily categorical to opt for one or another, especially when the judiciary has to ponder 
over a fair balance, as occurred in the UPC Telekabel case under consideration. 
Conclusion 
The UPC Telekabel ruling is the result of a cautious but optimistic attitude on the part of the 
CJEU towards ISP blocking injunctions; to some extent, however, it also demonstrates an 
attempt to save the unsavable.  
Aimed at granting rightsholders the entitlement to seek relief from intermediaries against 
copyright infringement by third parties, the remedy provides its addressee with an outcome 
obligation, but with no further impositions of what specific measures meet the terms of the 
order. The Court finds such an order to be compliant with EU copyright law as it virtually 
avoids the risk of endangering the already fragile equilibrium among all fundamental rights 
arising in this context.  
The CJEU is not persuaded by the AG’s argument that a fair balance can be struck only 
by imposing certain measures, since ISPs may choose measures that are more likely to endanger 
such an equilibrium. 
 Nevertheless, the discretion left to the intermediary may be too broad and concretely 
ends up in non-compliance. This consequence is supported by the cautious assumption of the 
Court that the measures to be adopted may be easily circumvented or, in any case, too expensive 
for the intermediary’s business. The ISP’s defence card of unreasonableness, which can be 
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played anytime by the respondent, must also be taken into account and may not be disregarded 
by the courts. Otherwise, the CJEU could have taken a more practical and perhaps blasé 
approach, similarly to the UK judiciary, which apparently seems to have reached the conclusion 
that a non-painful solution is far from being accomplished. 
In truth some compromise must be made, either at the cost of the copyright holders or 
sacrificing other stakeholders’ freedoms, without automatically implicating a “may the best 
man win” ending. Besides, there might still be a chance (or hope) of reaching a more 
comprehensive compromise for all sides concerned. 
Uncertainty remains in terms of the exact boundaries of the intermediary liability of 
providers; moreover, the lack of proper guidance, first, by the CJEU, can be a dangerous 
weapon in the hands of the judiciary. It is yet accurate to assume that an excessively rigorous 
picture may result in weakening the fair balance of fundamental rights that the CJEU seems to 
promote every step of the way. The Court’s tactful referral may be seen as the second-best 
solution to clarify the interpretation of the prickly issues thus far discussed, unless the European 
legislator makes its move and positively translates the concerns of the Court of Justice into 
statutory words.  
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